Li vs Lee: Executives, legislators, property, politics, and public opinion

Dr Michael DeGolyer, Associate Professor of Government and International Studies of the Hong Kong Baptist University and Director of the Hong Kong Transition Project, was the Foundation's guest speaker on 4 March 1999. This is a summary of his remarks.

Dr DeGolyer explained the work of the Hong Kong Transition Project. The project conducted attitude surveys three times a year to track the trend in public opinion. It also conducted surveys before and after elections. And more recently, utilising a conference format, the project had conducted an indepth study of how Hong Kong people reacted to public discussion of policy issues. Although well established in overseas countries such a study had not previously been conducted in Hong Kong.

Dr DeGolyer saw his mission as gathering facts to take the place of guesswork and preconception as to public opinion. That very morning he had been asked to give court evidence in the flag burning case. Ironically the police had not noticed that an offence, of burning the Chinese flag, had been taking place until it had been drawn to their attention by a journalist. The prosecution had argued that, since Hong Kong people were patriotic Chinese, the burning of the flag by the demonstrators would have caused upset and a breakdown of public order. However, Dr DeGolyer had been able to demonstrate, from the project's survey findings, that in fact Hong Kong people were largely indifferent to the Chinese flag. Burning the flag would pose no risk to public order whatsoever.

Support for the Government had been declining. From a high of 73% in February 1997, the satisfaction rating had fallen to 42% in October 1998, while Tung's own approval rating had fallen below 50%. Interestingly, Tung was more unpopular with women, and with people born in Hong Kong - the latter suggesting a danger that Tung was in danger of losing the support of Hong Kong people and thus being perceived as not embodying the promise of Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.

Of all the problems facing Hong Kong at present, it was the economy that worried by far the most people.

The main reason for the dissatisfaction with the Government was the economy. In October 1998, 53% were worried to some degree about their personal standard of living; although this was better than the 66% worry rating of June 1998, it was still a low score. In October, 66% were worried about Hong Kong's economic prospects.

One bright spot was corruption - which many had feared would increase after 1997. In June 1997 only one in five expressed themselves not worried about this, but in October 1998 the figure had risen to a more comfortable 53%. Another was personal freedom. Here less than half - 45% - had expressed themselves not worried in June 1997, but by October 1998 the figure had risen to a very solid 74%. Dr DeGolyer felt that the Government could take pride in its record on assuring people of protection of their personal freedoms.

Of all the problems facing Hong Kong at present, it was the economy that worried by far the most people. Of seven issues - living standards, security/freedom, family prospects, economy, political stability, corruption and Government efficiency - the economy was rated the most worrying by 49% in October 1997 and none of the other factors by more than 10%.

Other possible worry areas were also explored: employment, property market, value of the Hong Kong dollar, the Hong Kong stock market, and social unrest. Of these, all factors achieved more than half expressing themselves not worried, except social unrest, which scored only 21% not worried. Worry about social unrest if the economy deteriorated further was extremely high. The sense of stress was very high. Of a list of economic, social and political issues of personal concern given to respondents, the economic issues attracted 80% of the responses, with unemployment (47%) and negative growth rate (20%) attracting the most attention.

On public policy issues, the most popular policies were spending more on education, providing low fixed rate mortgages for owner-occupier home buyers, and introducing more unemployment benefit. The recent moves to cut the CSSA, which is all that is available because there is no unemployment insurance in Hong Kong, could cost the Government very dearly in public support, particularly among older age groups who had hitherto been Tung's most faithful supporters. If the Government had used even a small portion of the funds expended in the stock market intervention to provide Government subvented loans, it would have gained far more in public support than it had from the intervention itself.

Bottom line for 1998: the SAR administration has weathered a difficult year in which it has inflicted nearly as much damage on itself as was inflicted upon it by outside events. It is no longer sinking out of sight in public support, but there has not been a general return to the higher levels of approval seen in its first burst out of the gates in 1997. Some bright spots, such as controlling corruption and ensuring personal freedoms have been outweighed by rising economic concerns, ironically, the one area it went into office confident it would have little trouble from the public. Negatively, its relations with the elected representatives of the people, especially the directly elected members, are on the whole in poor shape and it has little sense of which policies cost it support and which provide a boost (at least, from all appearances). It has in place an aggresive, mostly elected legislature, which will have its ups and downs, to be sure, but one which will develop over the next few years increasingly confident of its mandate and legitimacy. Support for various parties, particularly the democratically inclined parties, is strongly more positive than support for Mr Tung. The civil servants are themselves either dispirited, aggressively pursuing their own interests or political bents, or adrift. Those who formulate policy and those who enforce it urgently need separation; now, they are the same people, a situation inviting real problems ahead and source of much of Asia's current problems. Executive-led government is not the same as government by Executive (that is usually called autocracy or dictatorship). Policy making should be by politicians accountable to the public, nor bureaucrats, whose job should be faithful, nonpolitical execution of directives.

Increasingly, unless Mr Tung turns around his low public approval numbers much further, he will be seen as a lame duck, particularly after the 2000 Legco elections. The 2002 election for the Chief Executive will begin right after the Legco elections, and with prospects of the 800 delegates to the Selection Committee being elected to their posts, or at least a good number of them, the democratic aspect of the next Chief Executive election will exceed by a good bit the results of the 400 hand-selected Beijing appointees who chose the first Chief Executive. The importance of public support for policies will grow, if not immediately under this executive, definitely and soon for those campaigning to be the next.

The above does not necessarily represent the views of the Foundation.